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Abstract
In this paper, we report on our experience with transitioning a research platform for performing
adversarial testing on distributed system implementations into a tool for teaching students how to imple-
ment robust distributed systems. We present how we integrated the tool in a graduate-level distributed
systems course by describing the modifications we made to the tool, the projects used in conjunction
with the tool, as well as the activities performed by the instructor and the students. We evaluated
the effectiveness of the tool through multiple surveys conducted throughout the class and reported the
results.
Keywords— Distributed Systems; Secure Programming; Computer Science Education; Robustness;
Virtualization; Testing
1 Introduction
One of the primary goals of distributed systems is to provide increased availability and performance for
their users. However, the increasing complexity of distributed systems, limited availability of testing tools,
and inadequate skills of developers often result in implementations that prevent distributed systems from
achieving their design goals in practice.
As instructors of distributed systems courses, we recognize the need to teach students the necessary
skill-sets to develop robust systems. While mastering the foundation of distributed algorithms is essential
in creating such systems, there are numerous aspects of distributed systems that are better learned by
experiencing their design and implementation. Numerous distributed algorithms use models that do not
specify the necessary details that are critical for the system. In addition, many systems consist of different
algorithms running in parallel which can not be trivially integrated. As a result, many decisions are made
during the implementation phase.
Several efforts were made over the years to improve distributed systems education. Many focused on
creating tools that help visualize the execution of distributed algorithms [3, 4, 7, 21]. While such tools are
instrumental in helping students understand the underlying dynamic behaviors of the entities involved in the
algorithms, they do not provide effective means for students to test and debug their own implementations.
Recently, some tools [11, 18, 20] are created to help the debugging and testing process in a course setting.
MDAT [18] offers automated testing of multi-threaded programs where test results are reproducible. How-
ever, it is not tailored for message-passing distributed systems, nor does it support any testing to evaluate
the robustness of the code. VDE [11] targets computer networking and provides students a framework lever-
aging a network of virtual machines to test their developed network protocols. However, VDE lacks any
automated support to drive such testing and provides support for a limited set of testing scenarios as it is
not focused on distributed systems.
In this paper, we report on our experience with transitioning a research platform developed for adversarial
testing of distributed systems into a tool for teaching students how to implement robust message-passing
distributed systems. We describe how we integrated the tool in a graduate-level distributed systems course.
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To measure the effectiveness of the tool, we conducted multiple student surveys. We reported our evaluation
results.
Unlike other testing environments, our tool allows students to run unmodified binaries of the system
under development in their native operating systems while emulating the network conditions. This not only
offers the experience of real world asynchrony but also enables the reproducibility of the test outcomes.
Moreover, the network emulation limits the impact of external noise and interference on the test results
as compared to testing on a network of computers connected through real network infrastructures (e.g.,
routers). Both students and instructors can test the same unmodified binary under identical conditions,
without implementing the code for the test case scenarios. The testing scenarios are mainly focused on the
messages pertaining to the system implementation under test. These scenarios combine manipulations on
the delivery and on the content of the messages. As a result, our platform1 even allows testing of Byzantine
resilient protocols such as the Byzantine Generals Problem [17], which are designed to tolerate Byzantine
behaviors of the participating node(s). Finally, the design of our platform combining virtualization with an
emulated network provides a cost effective approach as compared to the infrastructure costs associated with
any testbed of similar scale.
Our tool also has several benefits for the instructor. Firstly, it requires very little effort from the instructor
to setup the environment for a new project. The instructor needs to provide only a description of the format
of the messages pertaining to the protocol of interest. Secondly, it not only alleviates the burden of the
instructor by automating the generation of various testing scenarios but also provides enough flexibility for
creating new testing scenarios with specific requirement. Finally, the instructor can leverage our tool for
performing automatic evaluation of students’ submission in a scalable fashion for a large-size class.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In §2, we first describe the overview of the platform along
with the modifications we made to use it in a class setting. We next present how we integrated the tool in
the class along with a concrete example in §3. We present results from the surveys conducted in the class
as well as the lessons we learned in §4 and §5, respectively. We review related work in §6 and finally, we
conclude in §7.
2 Platform Overview
In this section, we first overview Turret [13, 19], the research platform we transition as an educational tool,
and then describe how we adapted it to use it in a distributed systems class.
2.1 Turret Overview
Turret is a platform (shown in Fig. 1) that allows adversarial testing of unmodified distributed system binaries
running in a realistic environment. Turret leverages virtualization to run arbitrary operating systems (e.g.,
Linux, Windows) and applications, and utilizes network emulation to connect these virtualized hosts through
a realistic network setting. The platform is automated and capable of reproducing network conditions while
isolating from outside world interference.
Virtualization and network emulation. For virtualization, Turret specifically uses KVM [12] virtual-
ization techniques. This allows Turret to have several virtual machines (VMs) running on the same physical
host whereas each VM acts as an individual node of the distributed system of interest. Each of the VMs
can run an application and communicate through the emulated network created using the NS-3 network
simulator [1]. Specifically, each VM is mapped to a node inside NS-3, called a shadow node, through a Tap
Bridge connection (available in NS-3), which connects the inputs and outputs of the network device of the
NS-3 node to the inputs and outputs of the VM’s network interface as if the NS-3 network device is a local
device to the VM.
Controller. The controller module of Turret bootstraps the system by starting NS-3 and running applica-
tion binaries (i.e., the target distributed system implementation) inside the virtual machines. The controller
lets each shadow node know if it will act as a benign (i.e., correct) node or as a malicious node. A shadow






















































S Managed by Student
I






Figure 1: Turret Platform (VNIC: Virtual Network Interface Card)
node instructed to act as malicious will activate the testing proxy, a component implemented by Turret on
top of the Tap Bridge layer of the NS-3 shadow node. This proxy intercepts messages generated by the
application running inside the virtual machines and modifies them according to an attack strategy2. An
attack strategy may consist of two types of malicious actions: Message Delivery Actions that affect when
and where a message is delivered (see Table 1) and Message Lying Actions that affect the contents of a
message (see Table 2). To function automatically, the testing proxy requires the user to provide it with
a description of the format of the messages that the protocol3 (or the system) relies on. We will give an
example of a message format later in § 3.3.
Message parser generator. The testing proxy requires to parse messages in order to inject a malicious
action based on the type of the message. The message parser generator reads a message format description
and generates necessary source code containing a set of API calls (e.g., getMsgType(), getMsgSize()) that
exposes various content of the message to the testing proxy.
Table 1: Message delivery actions in Turret
Action Action Description Parameter
Drop Drops a message Drop probability
Delaying Injects a delay before it sends a message Delay amount
Duplicating Sends the same message several times instead of
sending only one copy
Number of duplicated
copies
Diverting Sends the message to a random node instead of its
intended destination
None
Table 2: Message lying actions in Turret
Action Action Description Parameter
LieValue Changes the value of the field with a specified value The new value
LieAdd Adds some amount to the value of the field The amount to add
LieSub Subtracts some amount from the value of the field The amount to subtract
LieMult Multiplies some amount to the value of the field The amount to multiply
LieRandom Modifies the value with a random value in the valid
range of the type of the field
None
2An attack strategy is considered as a test case
3We use system and protocol interchangeably to refer to the distributed system of interest
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Strategy generator. The strategy generator is responsible for generating a list of attack strategies that
a protocol of interest should be tested against. This list of strategies are generated based on the malicious
actions given in Tables 1 and 2 along with a value of the parameter(s) that decides the severity of the action.
We will give some examples later in § 3.3.
2.2 Adaptating Turret for the Class
The first task we focused on was to enable running multiple instances of Turret simultaneously. We tailor
Turret so that resources such as devices, addresses, and ports are configurable and sharable. The second
task we focused on was to make Turret easier to use. Specifically, we added two scripts to automate the
configuration. One is related to the management and configuration of the VMs, and the other one drives the
controller module of Turret. In addition to these scripts, we also prepared a tutorial on how to use Turret as
a testing platform. Finally, we altered the design of Turret to allow students to use their own message API
class generated by the message parser generator with the other pre-compiled Turret objects shared among
multiple instances of Turret.
3 Using Turret in the Class
We describe how we integrated Turret with a graduate-level distributed systems course offered in Spring
2013 and Fall 2014.
3.1 Class Structure
Students had to use this tool while working on the programming projects assigned in this course. Students
were assigned 3 projects which helped them learn the core concepts of distributed systems. The projects
were carefully designed where the complexity of the assignments would increase gradually. Considering the
complexity of the projects, students were given 3∼4 weeks to work on each project.
Project 1 - Byzantine agreement. The first assigned project was to implement a Byzantine consensus
protocol, one of the basic concepts in reliable distributed systems. Specifically, students had to implement the
authenticated byzantine agreement protocol to solve the classic Byzantine Generals’ problem [17]. Since it
was the first assignment, the objectives of this project were mostly centered around helping students achieve
a first-hand experience on distributed systems programming. While developing the protocol, students were
required to consider a synchronous communication channel that the protocol was proposed for. In theory,
a synchronous channel is typically assumed for ease and simple characteristics. However, implementing a
synchronous communication channel on top of an asynchronous communication channel such as the Internet
is quite challenging. Dealing with such a challenging issue not only offered students a better understanding
of the practical system implementation but also prepared them for the complexity of the subsequent projects.
Project 2 - Reliable multicast. Moving on to the next level, students were assigned the second project
where they had to implement the reliable total order multicast protocol [5], which is also included in the
ISIS toolkit [2]. This protocol offers a reliable multicast service between a set of servers where each server
delivers the multicast messages (to the application) in the same order. The objectives of this project include
achieving a deeper understanding of reliable multicasts by developing a practical multicast service on top of
an asynchronous communication channel. In fact, this was the project that offered students to work with a
protocol that was targeted to deal with the asynchrony of the real communication channel.
Project 3 - Paxos. Of all, the third assigned project was the most difficult in terms of not only the
number of lines of code to be written but also the complexity involved. The goal of the project was to
implement the Paxos replication protocol, a state machine replication protocol built on the Paxos consensus
protocol [15, 16]. We asked students to follow the description of the Paxos protocol from [14] targeted to
the development of the Paxos replication protocol by comprehending the subtle complexities of the original
protocol. Implementing such a complex system where multiple sub-protocols run in parallel offered the
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students to experience a tiny flavor of real-world large distributed systems used by tech companies (e.g.,
Google, Facebook) where a lot of services are backed by replication services like Paxos.
Final project. While the tool was not required for the testing of the final project, two teams chose to use
Turret.
Access to Turret. We granted students access to Turret since the release of the first project assignment.
Students were free to use the tool while implementing their projects. In addition to providing a tutorial for
Turret, we arranged a demo session for the students to demonstrate how to get started with this tool. For
each project, students were provided a sample list of test cases with the expected outcome for testing their
projects prior to submission except for the first project where we asked students to submit their code in two
phases. In phase 1, their submitted code was tested using a set of test cases. We provided them the feedback
containing the test results so that they could fix their code, if necessary, prior to submitting in phase 2. We
used an additional set of test cases in phase 2. We graded the first project such that a student would lose
half the score assigned to a test case if her code fails the test case in phase 1 but passes in phase 2. However,
in case of other projects, we required students to submit once and graded using a set of test cases including
the sample provided to the students.
3.2 Setup of the Testing Environment
Turret provides each student enrolled in the class with her own testing environment. To do so, we granted
each student access to a multi-core Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E52690 @2.90GHz server machine equipped with
200 GB RAM and running Gentoo Linux 2.2. Each student was assigned 5 VMs where each VM is equipped
with 128 MB RAM. We used Ubuntu 11.10 server with Linux Kernel 3.0 as the guest OS for the VMs.
At the beginning of the semester, we provided each student with a package Turret-User containing
the necessary code and scripts to create and configure her own testing environment. To setup the testing
environment, each student needs to create her own VM instances utilizing the provided VM-related script.
It involves generation of fresh VM copy-on-write disk images from a shared base VM image (to reduce the
space overhead), instantiation and preparation of the fresh VMs, and creation of tap-devices to be equipped
as virtual network interfaces to these VMs. The preparation of a VM specifically includes configuring the
network interfaces of the VMs, enabling public key-based authentication for easy and better user authen-
tication to the VMs, and managing static ARP entries to avoid ARP requests during the testing session.
Once prepared, students only need to start/stop the VMs as per requirement. Students were free to use the
same set of VM images for different projects in this class or they can create and prepare new VM images
using the provided scripts whenever necessary.
3.3 Example: Testing Project-1 with Turret
We now demonstrate the usage of Turret with an example, the Byzantine generals problem [17]. Specifically,
the problem is defined as given a set of generals (one commander and the others are lieutenants) capable
of communicating only through messages, the loyal (i.e., correct) generals need to come to an agreement
regarding the battle plan (i.e., either attack or retreat) in the presence of traitor generals. In reliable computer
systems, an analogy of this problem can be drawn as the problem of defending against Byzantine failures of
components of the system by guaranteeing that the correct components continue their services even if some
components (less than majority) exhibit Byzantine failures. One of the solutions to the Byzantine generals
problem presented in [17] involves authenticated messages, which means that each message is signed by the
sender of the message.
Message format and parsing. Turret requires a message format description to generate and equip
the testing proxy with necessary code enabling malicious injections during the experiment. The following
example shows the structure of a signed message used by the Byzantine generals to exchange the order (i.e.,




uint32_t type = 1; // Message type
uint32_t total_sigs; // Total # of signatures on the message
uint32_t order; // The order (retreat = 0 and attack = 1)
struct sig *sigs; // Point to array of total_sigs signatures
}
struct sig {
uint32_t id; // The identifier of the signer
uint8_t signature[256]; // Using a RSA private key of 2048 bits
};
...
The message parser takes this message format description and generates the necessary code containing
a set of API calls. The student then creates an executable binary by combining the message API code, a
NS-3 script to configure the emulated network, and the shared libraries. Note that each student creates this
executable under her own testing environment.
Traitor mode of generals. A traitor general can exhibit Byzantine failures. Students were given the
following test case scenarios where a traitor general can:
• Remain silent.
• Delay the sending of a message.
• Send a message to a random set of lieutenants.
• Flip the order of a message.
• Forge a randomly selected signature from the message.
Since each message is digitally signed, any modification to the message content made by a traitor lieu-
tenant will be detected and thus any loyal lieutenant will discard such messages. However, one interesting
case about the conflicting orders is worth noting here. When the commander is a traitor, it can send attack
to a random set of lieutenants and the conflicting order, i.e., retreat, to the remaining lieutenants. Both
the orders are valid in this case because of the valid digital signature on each message.
Note that students do not have to implement these malicious behaviors of the traitor generals. The
testing proxy of Turret includes the necessary code for such malicious actions. This demonstrates one of the
benefits of Turret requiring less effort both from the instructors and from the students.
Generating attack strategies. A list of attack strategies is generated by the strategy generator module
of Turret that takes in the message format description. For example, consider the following two strategies
where the testing proxy is being instructed to drop 90% of “SignedMessage” packets and lie about the order
(i.e., 3rd field in the structure) of the “SignedMessage” packets by setting it to retreat (i.e., 0).
Drop SignedMessage 90
LieValue SignedMessage 2 0
Though Turret comes with the script to automatically generate this list of strategies, we provided the
students with a sample list of strategies they used to test their implementations prior to submission.
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Running test cases. To start testing the code, a student first uploads her project source code to the
necessary number of VMs (assuming that the VMs of the student are already running) allocated to her. The
student then compiles her project on each VM. Students were encouraged to use scp program to upload and
make to compile their projects. Turret-User package contains the controller module, which is a perl script.
The student executes this script that takes in a list of traitor generals and a list of attack strategies, starts
the network emulator on the host machine and the student’s program on each of her VMs for each attack
strategy, and collects and stores the log messages produced by both the network emulator and the student’s
program. Moreover, this script contains numerous command line options to support various requirements of
the user.
Collecting and combining results. Two types of log messages are generated while testing with Turret:
one is generated by the NS3 emulator and the other is produced by the user’s program running on each
VM. The first log captures messages at the emulation layer and network layer inside NS3, which helps
troubleshooting the emulated network. The other log captures the output of the user program, which may
contain some error messages as well. When the student starts the testing phase, the controller collects these
two types of messages for each test case and stores in separate locations. Later, the student uses another
script called aggregator that combines the result of each test case and reports to the student for her analysis.
For example, consider the following output as the combined result where the traitor commander is running
on VM1 performing the LieValue SignedMessage 2 0 test scenario (attack strategy), and the three loyal
lieutenants are running on VM2, VM3, and VM4.
#=====================================#
Strategy: LieValue SignedMessage 2 0
#=====================================#
VM2: Lieutenant 1 : Agreed on retreat
VM3: Lieutenant 2 : Agreed on retreat
VM4: Lieutenant 3 : Agreed on retreat
Since in this attack the traitor commander (i.e., the testing proxy on the shadow node associated with the
commander) lies about the battle plan by setting it to retreat even though the commander has sent attack
as the order, all the loyal lieutenants must agree on retreat according to the protocol. Therefore, if the
student’s implementation produces the identical result, we can conclude that her implementation pass this
test case.
4 Results
We performed an evaluation to quantify the degree to which this course enhanced students’ learning experi-
ence by mostly focusing on their understanding of the fundamental concepts and their hands-on experience
with the projects. To do so, after each project, we collected students’ responses through anonymous, IRB-
approved surveys containing a variety of questions regarding their experience with the project as well as with
the tool (Turret). The participation in surveys was voluntary, but we observed that on average 66% of the
total students completed the surveys. We measured the effectiveness of Turret integrated with this course
by analyzing the responses from the students to the following survey questions:
• Q1: Was the time you spent on the lab worthwhile?
• Q2: Was the automated framework (Turret) effectively helpful in finding bugs in your code?
• Q3: Was the time you spent on learning and using Turret worthwhile?
• Q4: Did you attain the learning objectives of the lab?
• Q5: As a result of the lab, are you more interested in Distributed Systems?
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Figure 2: The summary of the students’ responses to the survey questions
Fig. 2 shows the received feedback for each project along with the combined feedback. The graphs show
the increase of positive reviews from project 1 to project 3 as students became more familiar with the tool.
Using a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), we quantitatively measured
the average response score of the feedbacks for each question. The score of the responses to Q1 is 4.18 after
project 1 and increases to 4.23 after project 3 (with a combined score of 4.0) indicating the time students
spent on the lab was worthwhile. Similarly, students’ found the tool very useful in testing their code as the
response-score of Q2 starts with 3.5 and ends up on 4.1 after project 3 with a combined score of 3.79. The
question Q3 that is whether learning the tool was worthy at all receives the similar response-score like Q2 as
it starts with 3.5 and ends up on 4.0 after project 3 with a combined score of 3.79. The question Q4 receives
a score of 4.14 when we combine the scores from all the projects indicating that the students’ confidence on
the concept. Furthermore, the project assignments help increase the students’ interest in distributed systems
as the combined response-score of the question Q5 is 4.0.
In addition to the positive feedback, we also noticed some negative experience, especially after project
2 (see Fig. 2). We attribute this to the problems that some students faced with the Turret due to its
limitations. In the next section, we discuss these aspects based on our observations in the class and on
additional comments provided by students in the surveys.
5 Lessons Learned
There are several lessons we learned from this experience with respect to limitations of the tool and its use
in the class.
Provide better network diagnostic reports. One of our pedagogical goals was to have students ex-
perience developing robust distributed systems by utilizing an automated testing tool such as Turret. After
the first project, several students learned a very pointed lesson of local testing and defensive programming
such as handling corner cases, input validation. However, the inherent nature of distributed systems causes
some bugs to occur after a particular sequence of events. Such bugs are only reproducible during concrete
executions. While testing with Turret, students also encountered such bugs that helped them realize the
importance of the full-fledge testing of their code by utilizing a tool like Turret. To help diagnose such
bugs, the network emulation layer of Turret provides a detailed trace of all packets exchanged between the
VMs. However, some students found this detailed trace not easy to follow and therefore failed to leverage
the benefit of the trace. We plan to address this issue by integrating a much simpler diagnostic report with
adequate tracing information to help students—even with little background on computer networks—debug
their code.
Detect congestion at the network emulation. While the network emulation provides a realistic, but
controlled, network for the virtual machines to connect and communicate, the underlying buffer of the NS-3
Tap-Bridge connection can become congested if a student’s code sends an uncontrolled number of packets
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resulting in a denial-of-service attack to the user application under test. We observed such incidents in case
of one of the projects where the code was flooding the network with packets. However, this was not the
case when those submissions were tested on an actual network of computers, which has a higher tolerance
to denial of service. We plan to address this issue by adding some protection mechanisms that will detect
such cases and provide corresponding feedback. As a preliminary measure, we already updated the project
descriptions by including a clear specification of what is allowed in the protocol design.
Detect incorrect VM setups. Despite the tutorial and a demo session on Turret, a small number of
students had problems with correctly setting up their VMs. This consequently prevented them from testing
their code before the issue was fixed. As a precautionary measure, we plan to include scripts that will allow
diagnosis and detection of incorrect VM setups.
Use of print functions. Many delays in debugging were caused by misunderstandings on how printf
function in C works in case of program crashing. We fixed this problem by adding a simple instructions in
the tutorial and in the project handouts.
Using the same configurations for developing and testing. Despite emphasizing that the configu-
ration used by the VMs we provide should be used during development, some students had their preferred
development setups. This resulted in a few situations where latent bugs such as unsafe memory access (e.g.,
buffer overflow) did not occur in the development environment, but occurred in the testing environment. We
plan to include examples from what we learned from these semesters to emphasize the importance of using
the same environment for both the development and the testing.
Allowing students to fix their mistakes. Finally, regarding the way students were allowed to use the
feedback from the tool, we learned that students overwhelmingly preferred fixing their mistakes. Recall
that we took a different approach in case of the first project assignment where we performed the testing on
students’ code in phase 1 and provided them with what is needed to be fixed to pass the test case in phase
2. For the last two projects, we had students test their code by themselves prior to submissions. Almost
everyone preferred the first approach as they believed they learned more from fixing their code while losing
only half the score for each failed test case. We plan to continue using the first approach for the other
projects in future.
6 Related Work
In this section, we only focus on the relevant works from an educational perspective. However, for a detailed
comparison between Turret and other research tools, we refer interesting readers to [13,19].
From an educational perspective, several efforts were made over the years towards the enrichment of
distributed systems education. Tools like [3,4,7,21] focus on the visualization of the execution of distributed
algorithms to help students better understand the underlying dynamic behavior, the internal mechanism, and
to provide them with some vital information which may be helpful for them in debugging their implementa-
tion. Another avenue of work directly focuses on improving the debugging and the testing of students’ code
in a course setting. MDAT [18] targets to multi-threaded programming assists debugging by instrumenting
the students’ program to fully control the scheduling of threads and thus reproduces a failed execution of
the program. By employing a specially designed unit testing framework, a test-first approach of writing
concurrent programs in Java is proposed in [20]. In contrast, our platform facilitates the robustness testing
of the unmodified implementations of distributed systems developed by students, even at the presence of
malicious attacks injected to the messages in transit. Moreover, our testing platform can support testing of
any message-passing distributed protocol.
The emergence of cheap and effective virtualization makes it to be adopted in computer science education
for pedagogical purposes [8–11,22]. Among them, most closely related is VDE [11] that provides a framework
for students to test their developed network protocols, network security tools by creating a network of virtual
machines connected through the emulated data-link layer over a vde switch. However, unlike our tool, VDE
does not support any automated testing to evaluate the robustness of the implementation, let alone any
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adversarial testing. Seattle [6], a community-based effort to set up a platform environment, offers a cloud
in the educational environment that promoted resource usage. Our tool, on the other hand, offers an
inexpensive and private platform for testing robustness of distributed systems implementations. Moreover,
unlike Seattle, our tool is not dependent on any specific language.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we reported our experience with transitioning a research tool as an educational tool in a class
setting in order to teach students how to develop robust distributed systems. In addition to describing how
we integrated such tool in a graduate-level distributed systems course, we presented the evaluation of the
tool measured through multiple surveys focusing on how such integration was received among students. The
survey results and our anecdotal experiences indicate that the students felt the overall benefit of the tool.
We learned a few lessons about changes that we need to make to the tool, to the tutorial and documentation
provided, and to the project assigned in class. We plan to continue using the tool in distributed systems
classes and integrate with other courses such as security and computer networks. We also plan to develop a
distributed systems teaching module using this tool, which can be used by students and instructors at other
institutions.
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